Rechtbank Den Haag, 10-12-2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:16102, (09/842489-14), (09/767038-14 en 09/767313-14), (09/767174-13 en 09/765004-15), (09/767146-14), (09/767256-14), (09767238-14 en 09/827053-15), (09/767237-14), (09/765002-15), (09/767077-14) (english)
Rechtbank Den Haag, 10-12-2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:16102, (09/842489-14), (09/767038-14 en 09/767313-14), (09/767174-13 en 09/765004-15), (09/767146-14), (09/767256-14), (09767238-14 en 09/827053-15), (09/767237-14), (09/765002-15), (09/767077-14) (english)
Gegevens
- Instantie
- Rechtbank Den Haag
- Datum uitspraak
- 10 december 2015
- Datum publicatie
- 8 juni 2016
- ECLI
- ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:16102
- Zaaknummer
- (09/842489-14), (09/767038-14 en 09/767313-14), (09/767174-13 en 09/765004-15), (09/767146-14), (09/767256-14), (09767238-14 en 09/827053-15), (09/767237-14), (09/765002-15), (09/767077-14) (english)
Inhoudsindicatie
Unofficial translation of ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:14365. Only the Dutch text of the full verdict is authentic.
Up to six years of imprisonment for participants in a criminal terrorist organization
In the terrorism trial ‘Context’, the District Court of The Hague has convicted all nine suspects – eight men and one woman – to prison sentences up to 6 years.
Criminal organization with terrorist intent
Six men have been convicted for participation in a criminal organization with terrorist intent. They have been sentenced to custodial sentences ranging from three years (of which one year is suspended) to six years.
According to the Court, two men are followers. One of them has been convicted for incitement and sentenced to 43 days of imprisonment and two months of suspended imprisonment. The other, who has participated in a Syrian training camp for a very short period of time, has been sentenced to 155 days of imprisonment and six months of suspended imprisonment. The woman did not participate in the organization. She has been convicted for one inciting retweet and sentenced to seven days of imprisonment.
Recruitment organization in The Hague
The Court emphasizes that specific acts of the accused are punishable, and not their range of ideas. The Court has held that the six accused have participated in a recruitment organization based in The Hague, which incited, recruited, facilitated and financed youngsters who wanted to travel to Syria to fight there. Of these six accused, two men have been participating in the armed struggle in Syria up to now and a third man has returned from the struggle to the Netherlands.
In the case of two men, the Court has imposed more severe sentences than initially demanded by the Prosecution Service. One man who had travelled to Syria was sentenced as demanded. The others received lower sentences, because their role was more limited than the Prosecution Service had assumed and they were acquitted of several parts of the charges.
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The judgment includes considerations on jurisdiction, terrorist intent, preparatory acts, incitement, recruitment for armed struggle, training for terrorism and participation in a criminal (terrorist) organization, as well as considerations on several aspects of international humanitarian law (the existence of a NIAC in Syria, the status of foreign fighters in international law and the applicability of the EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism during armed conflicts).
Uitspraak
Criminal Law Section
CONTEXT TRIAL
Case numbers (09/842489-14), (09/767038-14 en 09/767313-14), (09/767174-13 en 09/765004-15), (09/767146-14), (09/767256-14), (09767238-14 en 09/827053-15), (09/767237-14), (09/765002-15), (09/767077-14)
Date of judgement: 10 December 2015
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: The charges
Chapter 3: Jurisdiction
Chapter 4: The investigation
Chapter 5: Investigation on the Internet (Facebook and Twitter)
Chapter 6: Developments in Syria
Chapter 7: Applicable law
Chapter 8: Terrorist crimes
Chapter 9: Other defences of inadmissibility
Chapter 10: Views of the accused on the armed jihadi struggle in Syria
Chapter 11: Incitement and dissemination of matter containing incitement, the legal framework
Chapter 12: Incitement and dissemination of matter containing incitement as charged
Chapter 13: Recruitment for armed struggle, the legal framework
Chapter 14: Recruitment for armed struggle as charged
Chapter 15: Conspiracy to, preparation and promotion of and participation in training to commit terrorist crimes, the legal framework
Chapter 16: Participation in training to commit terrorist crimes, as charged
Chapter 17: Conspiracy to, preparation and promotion of and participation in training to commit terrorist crimes, as charged
Chapter 18: Participation in a criminal (terrorist) organization
Chapter 19: Other charges Azzedine C.
Chapter 20: Other charges Moussa L.
Chapter 21: Legal findings, punishability of the offences and criminal liability
Chapter 22: Sentencing considerations
Chapter 23: Items seized
Chapter 24: Applicable sections of the law
1 Introduction
Many of the accused believe this trial prosecutes the Islam - or at least, their Islam. The defence also argued in a variety of ways that this trial is tantamount to criminalizing a religious persuasion. Not the accused’s acts, but their range of ideas is prosecuted and tried, the defence argued. They also asserted that any potentially unwelcome statements made by the accused were entirely or at least in large part protected by the right of freedom of speech to which the accused are entitled like everyone else. These accusations have prompted the court to start this judgment with some general considerations on the freedom of thought and opinion, the freedom of religion and personal beliefs, and the freedom of expression.
Everyone’s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is absolute. What people think and believe cannot be punishable. Only acts can be punishable, which include making statements, holding consultations, making plans or arrangements, and in a limited number of cases failing to do something when action was required.
Freedom of religion consists of more than the freedom to believe. Everyone is entitled to practise his religion, either alone or in community with others. To practise one’s religion also means to act according to the religion one adheres to, either alone or in a group. This includes observing religious rules and regulations, manifesting one’s faith in worship services, passing it on in education and upbringing, proclaiming it and founding organizations which have a religious object.
The freedom of religion and personal beliefs is deeply rooted in the Dutch (and European) legal order. This freedom is precious precisely because it applies equally to all religions and personal beliefs. It applies to Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, humanism and, of course, to Islam, in all its persuasions, denominations and variations.
Freedom of expression is one of the cornerstones of our democratic society and is a condition for progress in society and the development of every human being. A democratic society is characterized by plurality, tolerance and broad-mindedness, and therefore requires that there is also scope for the exchange of information, thoughts and opinions that shock, offend or alarm the State or a large part of the population. The freedom of expression is also deeply rooted in the Dutch (and European) legal order.
Restrictions may be set to these freedoms, amongst other reasons to protect the rights and freedoms of others or for reasons of public interest. It is not allowed, for instance,publicly to offend or threaten people, to publicly incite to discrimination or hatred and violence against people on the grounds of their race, religion or sexual preference, or to publicly incite to the commission of crimes. However, these restrictions must always (i) be provided for by law, (ii) serve a lawful purpose and (iii) be necessary in a democratic society.
The court will elaborate on this framework for review later on in this judgment, and use it as a basis for assessing whether the utterances with which six of the accused are charged are inciting and therefore punishable. At this point the court wishes to make sure, however, that there is no misunderstanding about the non-punishability of:
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i) gathering to study the Qur’an, or gaining a more in-depth knowledge of the Islam or certain denominations within the Islam, including Salafism;
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ii) doing Da’wah - Da’wah is an invitation to Islam -, whether in enclosed spaces, in the streets or on the Internet;
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iii) organizing and participating in demonstrations, whether they draw attention to the position of Muslim detainees or protest against the suppression of the Syrian population by Assad, against the screening of a film or proposed measures concerning the wearing of face-covering clothing;
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iv) collecting money or goods for humanitarian assistance to victims of the violence in Syria;
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v) protesting against the foreign policy of the western world or of the Netherlands, whether concerning Syria, Israel or Palestine and whether in the traditional media, social media or by means of demonstrations;
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vi) similarly campaigning against democracy as a form of government and criticizing the way in which this is given shape in the Netherlands;
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vii) openly sympathizing with the objects and actions of terrorist organizations such as IS and al-Qaeda, also if this is done through biased web pages.
That all this is possible, provided that it is done in a peaceful manner and with respect to the rights and freedoms of others, is one of the achievements of the democratic constitutional state.
The court also wishes to make sure that there is no misunderstanding that criminal law, subject to the freedoms referred to above, plays a limited but important role in countering terrorism. From an international point of view, terrorism is one of the worst crimes and it is incumbent upon all states to combat it. Criminal law is instrumental in both preventing acts of terrorism as much as possible and in prosecuting and trying them.
With regard to the former (the prevention of terrorism) the scope of criminal law has been extended considerably in the past ten years or so, particularly following the coming into force of the Act on Terrorist Crimes on 10 August 2004. This act implemented the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, obliging the Member States to expand their jurisdiction to include crimes committed with terrorist intent, and to adopt harsher penalties for these crimes plus some crimes that are committed to prepare or promote a terrorist crime. The Netherlands has implemented this Framework Decision extensively in the Act on Terrorist Crimes. For instance, conspiracy to commit certain serious terrorist offences was made punishable, and the penalization of preparing or promoting terrorist acts was defined broadly. The Act also made it an offence to participate in an organization which has as its object the commission of terrorist offences. For participation in a terrorist organization a harsher punishment was adopted than for participation in an ‘regular’ criminal organization. This Act also provided for an article that penalizes recruitment for armed combat and increases the punishment if this combat constitutes the commission of a terrorist crime. The Act also increased the punishment for incitement if it involved incitement to a terrorist crime. More recent legislation has expanded the scope of criminal law by penalizing taking part in training and training others for terrorism, as well as the financing of terrorism.
In this way the legislator wished to give a clear field to combating terrorism. Undeniably, the penalization of acts in the pre-stage has given criminal law a more instrumental character. Obviously, courts have to be guided by the legislator’s choice. Point of departure is still, however, that only acts are punishable.
The court emphasizes that in these proceedings no use has been made of special criminal procedural provisions regarding terrorism. The accused and the defence have been able to exercise all the rights that they are entitled to in a ‘regular’ criminal trial, And the court will arrive at its decision in the same manner and on the basis of the same criteria as in such a ‘regular’ trial. As in any other trial it will assess on the basis of the charges whether Dutch criminal law is applicable, whether prosecution is not barred, whether there is legal and conclusive evidence that the offences have been committed as charged, and answer the question whether there are grounds for excluding criminal liability.
Finally, in this introductory chapter the court notes that there is no evidence of any kind that the accused, living in the Netherlands, intended to commit a terrorist act in the Netherlands, nor that they incited others to do so. The court emphasizes, however, that it is incumbent upon the Netherlands to counter terrorism anywhere in the world, and to adopt measures to contain the numbers of Dutch (young) Muslims who wish to participate in the armed jihadi struggle in Syria.
2 The charges
The charges against the accused are set out in the (amended) indictment, which form part of this judgment as appendices A 1 through 12 inclusive. In summary, the charges are as follows:
With respect to Imane B. (09/842489-14)
Incitement to commit terrorist crimes, or crimes in preparation of or to facilitate terrorist crimes by co-administering and/or posting messages, images etc. on Facebook pages and/or a Twitter account, and/or
Dissemination of these inciting messages, images, etc.;
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of terrorist crimes, and/or
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of serious offences.
With respect to Oussama C. (09/767038-14 and 09/767313-14)
Recruitment for the armed jihadi struggle of five named individuals;
Incitement to commit terrorist crimes, or crimes in preparation of or to facilitate terrorist crimes by making speeches and/or posting messages on social media and/or making videos and sound fragments and uploading them to websites, including Nusrah bil-Jihaad on YouTube and/or other social media, and/or
Dissemination of these inciting speeches, messages, videos etc., as well as having in stock for dissemination other inciting files;
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of terrorist crimes, and/or
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of serious offences.
With respect to Azzedine C. (09/767174-13 and 09/765004-15)
Recruitment for the armed jihadi struggle of six named individuals;
Incitement to commit terrorist crimes, or crimes in preparation of or to facilitate terrorist crimes by (co)administering websites, including www.dewarereligie.nl, and posting speeches, articles and messages on them, and/or (co)administering and/or broadcasting speeches and songs on Radio Ghurabaa, and/or making videos and uploading them to YouTube, and/or posting messages and videos on various social media such as Twitter and Facebook, and/or organizing and/or participating in demonstrations, and/or
Dissemination of these inciting messages, videos etc., as well as having in stock for dissemination other inciting files;
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of terrorist crimes, and/or
Participation in an organization whose object it is to commit serious offences;
Incitement to hatred and/or discrimination and/or violence against people of Jewish descent on the grounds of their race and/or religion, and/or
Defamation of people of Jewish descent on the basis of their race and/or religion;
Libellous defamation against a civil servant.
With respect to Rudolph H. (09/767146-14)
Incitement to commit terrorist crimes, or crimes in preparation of or to facilitate terrorist crimes by (co)administering websites, including www.dewarereligie.nl, and posting speeches, articles and messages on them, and/or (co)administering and/or broadcasting speeches and songs on Radio Ghurabaa, and/or making videos and uploading them to YouTube, and/or posting messages and videos on various other social media such as Twitter and Facebook, and/or organizing and/or participating in demonstrations, and/or
Dissemination of these inciting messages, videos etc., as well as having in stock for dissemination other inciting files;
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of terrorist crimes, and/or
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of serious offences.
With respect to Jordi de J. (09/767256-14)
Preparation and/or facilitation of terrorist crimes by taking part in training for the armed jihadi struggle in Syria;
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of terrorist crimes, and/or
and/or
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of serious offences.
With respect to Moussa L. (09/767238-14 and 09/827053-15)
Incitement to commit terrorist crimes, or crimes in preparation of or to facilitate terrorist crimes by posting messages and/or videos on social media such as Twitter and Facebook, and/or making and/or taking part in videos and uploading them to YouTube, and/or
Dissemination of these inciting messages and videos;
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of terrorist crimes, and/or
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of serious offences;
Defamation of two police officers;
Incitement to commit terrorist crimes, or crimes in preparation of or to facilitate terrorist crimes by posting messages and/or images on Twitter;
Threatening, or alternatively insulting a police officer.
With respect to Hicham el O. (09/767237-14)
Conspiracy to, and/or
Preparation or promotion of murder with terrorist intent and/or manslaughter with terrorist intent and/or causing explosions with terrorist intent and/or
Preparation and/or facilitation of terrorist crimes by taking part in training for the armed jihadi struggle in Syria;
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of terrorist crimes, and/or
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of serious offences.
With respect to Hatim R. (09/765002-15)
Conspiracy to, and/or
Preparation or promotion of murder with terrorist intent and/or manslaughter with terrorist intent and/or causing explosions with terrorist intent and/or
Preparation and/or facilitation of terrorist crimes by taking part in training for the armed jihadi struggle in Syria;
Incitement to commit terrorist crimes, or crimes in preparation of or to facilitate terrorist crimes by posting messages and/or images on Facebook and Twitter, and/or
Dissemination of these inciting messages and images;
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of terrorist crimes, and/or
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of serious offences.
With respect to Anis Z. (09/767077-14)
Conspiracy to, and/or
Preparation or promotion of murder with terrorist intent and/or manslaughter with terrorist intent and/or causing explosions with terrorist intent and/or
Preparation and/or facilitation of terrorist crimes by taking part in training for the armed jihadi struggle in Syria;
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of terrorist crimes, and/or
Participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of serious offences.
3 Jurisdiction
All the accused are charged with having participated in a (terrorist) criminal organization. All indictments specify “The Hague and/or elsewhere in the Netherlands and/or in Iraq and/or in Syria” as places where the offences were committed.
Counsels for the defence of Imane B., Oussama C. and Moussa L. argued that it has not been established for a fact that the crimes to be committed abroad which this organization has as its object are also punishable in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, the requirement of double criminality for the Dutch court to have jurisdiction, in this case under Article 5(1)(2) (old) (Dutch) Criminal Code, has not been met. According to the defence, the prosecution of ‘crimes committed abroad’ is consequently inadmissible.
The accused Hicham el O., Hatim R. and Anis Z. are charged with, inter alia, conspiracy to murder and causing explosions, both with terrorist intent. According to the summons Hicham el O. committed these offences “in The Hague and/or elsewhere in the Netherlands and/or in Syria and/or in Yemen and/or in Iraq; Hatim R. “in the Netherlands and/or in Syria and/or in Iraq” and Aniz Z. “in the Netherlands and/or in Belgium and/or in Turkey and/or in Syria and/or in Iraq”. In answer to questions put to it by the court (immediately after the defence counsels’ speeches) the prosecution said in its reply1that it considered conspiracy proved for each of the accused only in as far as they were in Syria in July 2013. The court then pointed out to both prosecution and defence the revised regulation concerning the applicability of Dutch criminal law, which entered into force on 1 July 2014, particularly the new article 6 DCC and article 4(2) of the International Obligations with regard to Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction Decree (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2014, 47) (hereinafter: the Decree). The prosecution responded with a memorandum arguing that the Dutch court has jurisdiction over the crimes referred to here because (i) article 4(2) of the Decree has retroactive effect and (ii) there is double criminality because it emerged from the texts of relevant articles of the law which have been submitted that conspiracy to commit terrorist crimes is also punishable in Syria. Subsequently, the defence counsels for Imane B., Oussama C., Moussa L. and Hicham el O. expressed an opinion on the subject of jurisdiction in their rejoinder.
The court finds as follows.
Whether the court has jurisdiction should first and foremost be assessed on the basis of the charges, without consideration to whether the charges can be proven. If after answering the evidentiary question it turns out that there is no basis for jurisdiction of the Dutch courts, prosecution must be barred after all.2
Article 2 of the Dutch Criminal Code [hereinafter: DCC] provides that Dutch criminal law is applicable to anyone committing an offence within the Netherlands. If an offence is committed both inside and outside the Netherlands, prosecution of “the acts forming part of the offence that took place outside the Netherlands” is also possible pursuant to legal precedent.3 For this reason the defence as described in 3.2 fails.
Pursuant to art. 6 DCC in conjunction with art. 4(2) of the Decree Dutch criminal law is also applicable to Dutch nationals or aliens having permanent residence in the Netherlands committing a terrorist crime outside the Netherlands. The definition of a terrorist crime is given in art. 83 DCC. Conspiracy to murder with terrorist intent and conspiracy to cause an explosion with terrorist intent qualify, inter alia, as such terrorist offences.4
These provisions have entered into force on 1 July 2014. The question to consider, therefore, is if they also apply if the charges were committed abroad before that date. The answer to this question is of particular interest in the cases against Hicham el O., Hatim R. and Anis Z., because if the answer is negative the court will have to bar the prosecution with regard to conspiracy to murder with terrorist intent and conspiracy to cause an explosion with terrorist intent if it agrees with the prosecution that there is no evidence that these offences were also committed inside the Netherlands..
The possibility of assigning retroactive effect to criminal provisions is limited by the principle of legality.5 It entails that no retroactive effect can be vested in provisions penalizing an action or an omission. The prohibition on retroactive force to the detriment of an accused person also applies to provisions concerning the gravity and type of punishments to be imposed. This prohibition on retroactive force does not apply to provisions under which the Netherlands expands its jurisdiction, however. The Supreme Court, for instance, in its judgment of 21 October 2008 (NJ 2009, 108), found explicitly that there was no provision opposing the assigning of retroactive force to a jurisdiction provision regarding the prosecution of genocide in the International Crimes Act. Subsequently, the legislator, with retroactive force, expanded the jurisdiction in this Act for the prosecution of genocide.6 In the explanatory memorandum to the bill that led to this amendment of the International Crimes Act the Minister of Justice did emphasize that, generally, restraint should be exercised in assigning retroactive force to a regulation changing the jurisdiction rules7, and in answer to a parliamentary question if this is desirable only in very exceptional circumstances8he said that whether there are exceptional circumstances justifying the conferral of jurisdiction with retroactive effect should be looked at on a case-by-case basis.
When revising the rules regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal cases the legislator explicitly chose not to limit its exercise to offences committed after the entry into force of the new provision.9After a comment on this in the advice of the Council of State, the retroactive effect of articles 5, 7(3) and 8(c) Dutch Criminal Code has been limited in article IV of the Bill.10 From this it may be inferred, as the prosecution has, that the new article 6 DCC and article 4(2) of the Decree which is based on it, have unlimited retroactive effect.
This conclusion, which is in itself correct, is hardly compatible with the remark in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, that the proposed new article 6(1) DCC does not mean to change the scope of the existing jurisdiction rules, however.11The Explanatory Memorandum to the Decree also says that the possibilities to exercise jurisdiction under article 6 DCC in conjunction with the provisions in the Decree have remained unaltered in a substantive sense compared to the possibilities under to the old provisions in the Dutch Criminal Code.
This caused the court to investigate what extraterritorial jurisdiction options existed with regard to terrorist crimes under the old regime. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Decree, what is provided for in article 4(2) of the Decree corresponds with part of the (former) article 5(a)(1) DCC. The court believes that this is based on a misunderstanding. The said (former) article 5(a)(1) DCC declared Dutch criminal law applicable to aliens who have domicile or residence in the Netherlands and who commit a number of crimes abroad specified later on in this article, which include terrorist crimes. Strangely however, there was no such provision for people possessing Dutch nationality. The jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed abroad by Dutch nationals was provided for in (the former) article 5 DCC. It provided that Dutch criminal law was only applicable if the offence that is considered punishable pursuant to Dutch criminal law was also punishable in the country in which it was committed, with the exception of the crimes listed in the article to which the requirement of double criminality did not apply. These did not include terrorist crimes. Important in this connection is also (the former) article 4 DCC, which declared Dutch criminal law applicable to anyone who committed, inter alia, certain terrorist crimes abroad, but only if ‘either the offence is committed against a Dutch national, or the suspect is in the Netherlands’12or in the case of terrorist crimes which were aimed, summarily put, at the Netherlands.13Therefore, the court concludes that under the old rules Dutch criminal law was applicable to aliens residing in the Netherlands who committed a terrorist crime abroad that is not directly aimed against the Netherlands, but was not applicable to Dutch nationals who committed such a crime abroad, except, of course, it was demonstrated that the crime is also punishable in the country where it was committed (which will usually be the case).
Article 9(1)(c) of the Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union on Combating Terrorism of 13 June 2002 (PbEU [Official Journal of the European Union ] L164) obliges member states to create jurisdiction with regard to its own citizens or residents who commit the crimes referred to in the Framework Decision. As is evident from the parliamentary history to the bill that led to the Act on Terrorist Crimes14the legislator for the implementation of this obligation did not consider it necessary to amend the law as far as nationals were concerned, because the existing article 5 DCC provided for them, but it did for residents, and as a result amended article 5(a) DCC15. As the court explained above, this led to the creation of a broader extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist crimes in respect of aliens residing in the Netherlands than in respect of Dutch nationals. The parliamentary history offers no basis to assume that the legislator wished to make this distinction intentionally.
Article 4(2) of the Decree has put an end to this unintended and unjustifiable distinction. Dutch criminal law does not distinguish between Dutch citizens and foreign residents of the Netherlands who commit a terrorist offence abroad any longer, irrespective of whether the offence is punishable in the country in question. The court considers it justifiable to attach retroactive effect to this provision because (i) this concerns the implementation of an obligation under a Framework Decision of the European Union that has existed since 2002, (ii) this provision repairs a flaw in the implementation of this Framework Decision and (iii) the legislator explicitly intended to assign retroactive force to this decision.
The conclusion must be, therefore, that the Dutch courts have jurisdiction over a) offences that have been committed in the Netherlands or partly in the Netherlands and partly abroad and b) terrorist offences including conspiracy to murder with terrorist intent and conspiracy to causing an explosion with terrorist intent that have been committed abroad by Dutch citizens and aliens residing in the Netherlands.16